























The paper discusses the possible role of credibility for the EMS disinflations. Based
on an empirical analysis of credibility it is found that the EMS has operated quite
differently than has been suggested by the `DM~one` hypothesis of the EMS.
It is shown that after some short initial transition phase the EMS has
functioned as a bipolar system with a`hard currency` option supplied by the
German Bundesbank and a`soft currency` option offered by the Banque de France:
whilst the Netherlands almost from the onset of the EMS ha,g been committed to
the `hard currency` option, the `soft currency` alternative has played an important
role for the remaining small EMS economies, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, at
least in the early stages of the EMS. At a later stage of the EMS this `soft
currency` bloc has disintegrated and some countries, most noticeably Ireland and
to a lesser extent also France, have shifted towards the `hard currency` standard. It
is argued that this increased tightening of the EMS provides a favourable starting
condition for the transition to Economic and Monetary Union.
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1. Introduction
Has the European Monetazy System (EMS) helped member countries to disinflate
during the 1980s? This question is at the heart of an on-going debate, and no
consensus has yet been reached. Two major argument have been put forward with
respect to the potential deflationary benefits of EMS membership: the `credibility`
argument states that the EMS may have reduced the costs oJdefintion, whilst the
`discipline' argument states that EMS may have raised the costs ojinjlntion. The
main focus below is on the credibility aspects of the EMS. It is the aim of the
paper to provide some empirical evidence on whether or not EMS membership has
provided a'credibility` bonus.
Drawing on the new classical literature of monetary policy games, Giavazzi
and Giovannini (1987) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) were the first to formulate
the EMS `credibility` hypothesis. In their opinion the EMS represents an
institutional arrangement which has enabled the non~erman EMS member
countries to borrow counterinflation reputation from the Bundesbank by credibly
pegging their bilateral exchange rates relative to the German mark. This implies
that the EMS has worked in an asymmetrical fashion: the Bundesbank
independently chooses its monetazy policy whilst all remaining EMS member
countries have `tied their hands` on monetary policy and simply targeted their
bilateral German mark exchange rates. Hence the EMS may be viewed as a de
jacto `DM-~one`.
1'o date, no firm empirical evidence supporting this `credibility` hypothesis has
been provided. On the contrary, the `DM~one` story of the EMS has recently been
criticized by De Grauwe (1988), Fratianni and von Hagen (1989, 1990a,b) and
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), amongst others, mainly on empirical grounds. These
studies find a rich structure of cross~ountry policy interactions: whilst Germany
exerts a signíficant influence on many EMS countries, it is itself not immune from
influences in the opposite direction. In addition, the non-German EMS countries,
most noticeably France, are also found to transmit their policy impulses to other-z-
non-German EMS economies.~ This evidence therefore suggests an almost
`symmetric' functioning of the EMS.
The present paper offers a third view of the EMS: it is argued that after some
short initial transition phase the EMS has functioned as a bipolar system with a
`hard currency` option offered by the German Bundesbank and a`soft currency'
option supplied by the Banque de France. Whilst the Netherlands almost from the
onset of the EMS have been committed to the `hard currency` option, the `soft
currency` alternative has played an important role for the remaining small EMS
economies, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, at least during most of the deflation
period. R,ecently this `soft currency` bloc of the EMS has disintegrated and some
countries, in pazticular Ireland and to a lesser extent France, have shifted towards
the `hazd currency` standard, which itself has mellowed somewhat.
Some tentative evidence supporting this view is provided in Figure la, which
displays the time-paths of the bilateral nominal exchange rate indices (March
1979 - 100) of EMS currencies relative to the German mark. With the exception
of some wavering in late 1980, the German mark clearly was the `hard currency` of
the EMS since all currencie.s depreciated relative to ít. Furthermore, three groups
of EMS currencies can be easily identified: whilst the Dutch guilder exchange rate
apparently followed a stationary time path, the Italian lira exchange rate exhibited
trend movements throughout the EMS period and the French franc, Belgian franc,
Danish krona and Irish pound exchange rates switched from trend devaluations to
level pegs at various points in time between late 1982 and early 1987. During this
time the currencic;~ in Lhis last group, in which Lhe hrench I~ra.nc wa.v rlcarly Lhe
weakest, experienced similar devaluations, which in turn iruplied relatively stable
French france exchange rates, as shown in Figure lb. It is argued here that by not
resisting the `soft currency` option of a crawling peg, the small EMS countries
Belgium, Denmazk and Ireland have inherited an`inflation reputation` similar to
that of France and therefore the `DM~one` hypothesis of the EMS appears
unwarranted.
This interpretation is also supported by Figure 2a, which displays the
time-paths of EMS inflation rates. Whilst it is obvious that after the initial
inflationary impact of the 1979 oil price shock all EMS countries have had
considerable success in reducing inflation between early 1982 and late 1986, the
convergence to the low German levels of inflation rates has been slow and less than
complete. The existence of a`soft currency` option explains this delay in
convergence. Furthermore, the close resemblance of German and Dutch infation
rates throughout the entire EMS period points towards the existence of a`small
DM~one', which in connection with the apparent similarity of inflation-3-
developments in France, Belgium and Denmark during the deflation period
(1982-86) justifies the above interpretation of the EMS as a bipolar system.
The existence of the two options in the EMS can also explain the empirical
findings of Rogoff (1985b), Ungerer et al. (1983, 1986), Collins (1988), Artis (1987)
and Weber (1990b) that disinflation inside the EMS has not been vastly ditfcrent
from that outside the system. If anything, deflation in the EMS has been slower
since, as stressed by De Grauwe (1990), the EMS economies could not adopt a
`short sharp shock` treatment due to their exchange rate constraint. In Figure 26
most of the inflation reduction in the United Kingdom and the United States was
achieved relatively quickly in the short period of mid-1980 to mid-1983, whilst the
German and French deflations only started in late 1981 and took until late 1986 to
be completed. However, despite having been slower, the EMS deflations alsa
appear to have been longer lasting, as the strong reflations of the United Kingdom
and the United States in the post 1987 period suggest. The present paper explains
this fact by the recent convergence of the EMS to a'hard currency' standard: the
non~erman EMS member countries have belatedly embraced the `hard currency`
option, which has strengthened the disciplinary effects of the EMS, whilst
Germany's anti-inflation policy stance appears to have mellowed slightly, as
indicated by the rise in German inflation rates during 1987-90. In view of the
`DM~one` hypothesis it is important to note that the `hard~urrency` standard of
level pegging the German mark exchange rate was not a feature of the EMS from
its start; it emerged in a later phase and at various points in time as the result of
deliberate policy switches in the EMS economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a definition
of the concepts of reputation and credibility and reputation and discusses their
potential role in disínflation. Gaining credibility is thereby related to alternative
monetary policy instruments. Section 3 describes the results of the empirical
analysis of reputation and credibility in view of major policy measures and policy
switches. A discussion of some policy implications concludes the paper.-4-
2. Reputation, Credibility and the EMS Deflations
2.1. The Conoepts of R,eputation and Credibility
In the theoretical literature the terms `reputation` and 'credibility` are often used
interchangeably,z but for the purpose of the empirica.l analysis below a clear
distinction between the two concepts will be made.
The term 'reputation` is limited to the concept of counterinflation reputation.
This is defined as the extent to which prior beliefs concerning the anti-inflation
orientation of policymakers conform to the way in which inflation control is
exercised. Counterinflation reputation can only be established by low inflation
performances. It is measured in terms of the probability which the public assigns
to the consistent pursuit of a low inflation policy and is derived by learning over
time.3
The term `credibility` is used in a broader context. It is defined as the extent,
to which beliefs concerning a policy conform to official announcements about this
policy. In this context obtaining `credibility` requires `precommitment`, which may
or may not be binding.4 Two measures of credibility are used in this study:s
- average crodibility (AC) measures the extent to which the public expects
policy outcomes to deviate from prior policy announcements. The smaller this
deviation, the larger is average credibility.
- marginal credibility (MC) focuses on the ability of policy announcements to
influence the public's expectations; ít measures the impact of a unit change
in the announcement on expectations and may be thought of as the weight
placed on the announcement ín the public's expectations formatíon process.
This weight is equal to unity ií the policymaker always makes completely
accurate (fully credible) announcements and tends towards zero the more
noisy announcements become.
Whilst credibility and high reputation aze usually unquestioned criteria for a good
public policy, in the case of deflation they take on special importance. Credibility
about a pre-announced deflation policy may reduce or even eliminate the output or
unemployment costs of disinflation by achieving a U-turn in expectations at the
time when the policy is changed. A similar argument applies for an unannounced,
`short sharp shock` deflation: the quicker the policymaker establishes a
counterinflation reputation, the shorter will be the transition period during which
expectations adjust. This is the De Grauwe (1990) argument from above.
Summazizing, it can be stated that all policymakers planning disinflation will find
it advantageous to gain counterinflation reputation and credibility.-5-
2.2. Ways of Gaining Credibility and Reputation
Although it is clear that counterinflation reputation may only be established by
consistently low inflation performance, how ca,n central banks establish credibility?
One possibility is mentioned in Rogoff (1985a), who states that the widespread
adoptiou of intermediate monetary quantity target announcements during the
seventies may be viewed as an institutional reform by central banks aimed at
resolving their credibility problem. He demonstrates that monetary targeting
under a`conservative`, that is, counterinflationary, central banker can reduce the
time~onsistent rate of inflation. The role of credibility in this process is modelled
in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) who show that 'credible` monetary target
announcements can speed up the transition to a low-inflation equilibrium and
hence reduce the welfare costs of disinflation.
An alternative scenario of gaining credibility is outlined in Giavazzi and
Spaventa (1989), who state that for a small open economy an institutional reform
such as entering a fixed exchange rate system may help to establish credibility. In
this case, announcing an exchange rate target relative to a low-inflation country
reduces the time-consistent rate of inflation.s
Finally, targeting nominal interest rates may be adopted by EMS countries as
a short-run operational procedure for targeting the exchange rate within the
fluctuation band. Under this scenario announcing an interest rate target consistent
vrith a fezed e.zchange rate and given interest rates in the low-inflation country
reduces the time~onsistent rate of inflation.7
All three forms of gaining credibility will be studied empirically below. In this
context the question arises as to which of these alternatives was chosen by
policymakers in the individual EMS member countries in order to disinflate and
whether monetary policy had consistently been orientated towards just one of these
intermediate targets. If policy target switches occurred, the most likely dates of
such policy switches will be estimated endogenously and compared with the timing
of major policy events, as summarized in Table 1. It is thereby tested whether or
not such policy shifts have led to more credible policy undertakings.-6-
3. The Empirical R.elevance ofCredibility and Reputation for
the EMS Disinflation
3.1. The Counterinflation It,eputation of Policy-makers
'Phe first empirical issue to be discussed here is how the EMS has aSfected the
counterinflation orientation of policy-makers in EMS member economies. Is the
German Bundesbank the central bank with the highest anti-inflation reputation as
implied by the 'borrowing reputation~ hypothesis of Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)?
Has German anti-inflation reputation been undermined during the EMS?
As noted above, counterinflation reputation is defined as the probability that
policy-makers consistently pursue low-inflation policies. This probability is
estimated here by using a Bayesian procedure.8 The intuition behind this method is
as follows: assume a number of alternative time series models are used for
forecasting inflation and that these modek differ only in the degree to which
permanent inflation shocks are allowed to occur. The relative success of these
forecasts may then~évaluated over time in terms of the probability that a linear
combination of the forecasts predicts inflation better than each model separately.
The weight attached to the 'low-inflation~ model then yields the desired mcasure
for counterinflation reputation.
Figure 3 presents the estimates of counterinflation reputation for all EMS
economies for the Bretton Woods period (65Q1-71Q2), a pre-EM5 period
(71Q3-79Q1) and the EMS period (79Q2,89Q4).9 'I'hree key Gndings should bc
mentioned: first, Germany, closely followed by the Netherlands, has the highest
anti-inflation reputation prior to and during thc EMS pcriod. In butL cases
reputation is unaffected by the onset of the EMS. Second, the small EMS
economies Belgium, Denmark and Ireland have gained anti-inflation reputation
during the EMS period. Finally, France and Italy have the lowest counterinflation
reputation and have not increased their reputation during the EMS period.
These estimates of counterinflation reputation are largely consistent with the
actual inflation performances in Figure 2a. Germany and the Netherlands entered
the EMS with low inflation rates. The relatively low inflationary impact of the
1979 oil price shock in Germany and the Netherlands in connection with their
relatively smooth disinflations (1982-1986) explains the preservation of
counterinflation reputation in both countries. France and Italy on the other hand
entered the EMS with high inflation and their double~igit inflation performances
up to 1983 did not help to enhance reputation until quite late in the EMS period.
Finally, the gains in counterinflation reputation of the small EMS economies are-7-
consistent with the `borrowing reputation` argument of Giavazzi and Pagano
(1988), in particular as these gains in reputation went hand in hand with a
reduction and convergence of inflation rates to the low German levels.
Having ascertained that some countries have gained counterinflation
reputation during the EMS period, the question arises whether this can be
attributed to credible DM exchange rate pegging policies in the EMS or whether
reputation has been established independently by other forms of credible monetary
policy. To address this issue the credibility of money stock, exchange rate and
interest rate targeting policies is evaluated empirically below.lo
3.2. The Credibility of Precommited Monetary Quantity Targeting Policies
As noted above, the move to monetary growth target announcements may be
viewed as an attempt by central banks to resolve their credibility problem. Has
this form of signalling policy intentions helped EMS central banks to establish
credibility? In answering this question it is important to note that money stock
targeting, which was adopted~ÁGermany, France and Italy in the mid-1970s under
more freely floating exchange rates, has remained part of the monetary policy
stance of these countries during the EMS system of fixed but adjustable exchange
rates. However, since monetary authorities cannot independently target both the
exchange rate and the money stock at the same time, this may render one of the
two policy targets non~redible if both are set inconsistently with one another.
Under which conditions can monetary target announcements be expected to
command credibility? Andersen and Risager (1988) state that continuity is an
important factor for the success of any stabilization policy. Although different
monetary or credit aggregates with differing degrees of controllability by the
monetary authorities were targeted, all countries occasionally switched from one
monetary aggregate to another in order to improve monetary control (see Table 2
to 5). This discontinuity clearly represented a serious obstacle to establishing
credibility. Furthermore, EMS countries had only limited success in hitting their
monetary targets. Germany, for example, had some success with money stock
targeting from 1979 to 1985, but in the post-1985 period monetary targets were
consistently overshot and control could not be regained by switching the targeted
monetary aggregate. In France, on the other hand, money stock targeting has been
implemented quite successfully in the post-1985 period.
Has this affected the credibility of monetary target announcements? Recall
that credibility is related to differences between announced and expected money
growth rates and that marginal credibility (MC) measures the percentage effect of-8-
a change in the announcement on expectations. In view of the volatile history and
limited success of monetazy tazget announcements in EMS member countries, it is
hazdly snrprising that the credibility estimates in Table 6 are relatively low.li The
main re8ult may be chazacterized as follows: whilst there aze some credibility gains
for France during the EMS, credibility declines for Italy and Germany, in the
latter case drastically.
This raises the questioa why central banks have failed to establish credibility
through money stock tazget announcements. First, 'Goodhart's law', a
modification of the 'Lucas critique' according to which the attempt to control a
monetary aggregate will destabilize the demand for it, may apply. This azgument
has been frequently made in connection with the recent switches between the
tazgeted monetary aggregates by the Bank of England, the Banque de France and
the Bundesbank. An alternative explanation is mentioned by Boissieu (1988), who
states that "centra! banks prefer to kcep some fued points, even if they overshoot
announced tnrgets. The loss of credibility and reputation woutd be greater in the
case ojabolitíon than it is vrith overshooting."t~ The estimates discussed above do not
support this view: whilst moderate tazget overshooting may only reduce
credibility, massive target misses result in an insignificantly low credibility
estimates. This implies that monetary tazget announcements no longer provide the
public with useful information about monetazy policy and under these
circumstance monetary tazget announcements may just as well be abolished.-9-
3.3. The Credibility of Preoommited Exchange Rate Tazgeting Poóciea
Two major questions arise from the above findings: first, can the Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1987) or Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) hypothesis of ~borrowing
reputation' through credible exchange rate pegging policies explain the increase in
counterinflation reputation in the smaller EMS economies? Second, may the
motivation for the EMS entry of France and Italy be explained by the Giavazzi
and Spaventa (1989) argument that exchange rate targets have a higher credibility
than monetazy targets, since as all major EMS economies have failed to establish
credibility through monetary target announcements? Both issues will be discussed
below.
In order to judge the credibility of a central bank's commitment to official
bilateral exchange rate parities the AC and MC credibility measures are
calculated. Since fixed exchange rates are not a novelty of the EMS, but have
prevailed during both the Bretton Woods system (BWS) and for some EMS
economies during the European currency snake system (ECS), these credibility
measures are calculated for each of these historical episodes.
Figure 4 presents the evidence from the MC credibility estimates which
measure the ímpact of the parity announcements on exchange rate expectations. It
may be viewed as the degree to which exchange rate e~cpectations are ruled by
confidence in the parity announcements rather than being governed by chartist
(backward looking) behaviour.t3 A natural benchmark for judging the credibility of
exchange rate parity announcements therefore is MC?0.5, in which case the
confidence factor dominates. From Figure 4, which displays the MC estimates of
the Bretton Woods period relative to both the snake period (triangles) and the
EMS period (squares), two results are obvious: first credibly fixed exchange rates
(MC~0.5) were the rule under the Bretton Woods system (23 out of 27 MCs) and
the European currency snake system (8 out of 10 MCs), but the exception under
the EMS arrangement (7 out of 21 MCs)! Second, the MC measure reveals that the
credibility of the exchange rate commitment of central banks declined, in many
cases significantly,14 in the EMS system relative to the the Bretton Woods system ur
the European currency snake system. Note that both results may be explained by
the higher degree of exchange rate flexibility in the EMS, as reflected by the wider
fluctuation margins of f2.25qo as compared to flqo under the Bretton Woods
system or f 1.125qo under the European currency snake system.15 They also may
partly be attributed to the fact that the EMS exhibited both a much higher
frequency and size of parity realignments than the Bretton Woods system.-10-
The above results indica,te that amongst the historical post-war systems of
fixed but adjustable exchange rates the EMS was the least credible system. Does
this imply that it did not provide a'credibility bonus` [or disinflation'? '1'o answer
this question the AC and MC credibility measures were estimated by splitting the
overall EMS period (79M3-89M12) into three EMS sub-periods (79M3-83M2,
83M2,S6M12, 87M1-89M12). The resulting estimates of the MC and AC
credibility measures are presented in Figure 5 and 6.
The key result from Figure 5 is that the EMS has not functioned as ,~.
`DM~one` where all non~errnan central banks wcre cralibly cornmitted t.o t.hr.
'hard currency` option provided by the German mark. Instead, the EMS is found
to have operated as a bipolar system in which the French franc offered a`sott
currency' alternative to the 'hard currency' option of the German mark: whilst the
Netherlands were almost from the onset of the EMS committed to the `hard
currency' option, the 'soft currency` option appears to have played an important
role for the remaining small EMS economies Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, at
least in the early stages of the EMS. This may be illustrated by referring to
Figure 5, which clearly indicates the existence of a`soft currenc~ ~ bloc with France
at its centre (box Ia). Exchange rates in this `soft currency~ bloc ~f the EMS werr
credibly pegged, as is reflected by the high credibility estimates in both pre-198ï
periods for the French franc exchange rates of Belgium (Jb), lreland (je), Denmark
(fd) and to the bilateral rates between these economies (he,de.. Ilowever. these~
close French franc linkages of Denmark ( f~ and Ireland ; je a~nc: ~c a,esser extent
of Belgium (Jb) dissolve after 1987, as also illustrated ir. FiEUre ~;box lb~. Not~.
that this structure of the credibility estimates is consistent wiit~ ;;~o-~ L;me-paths o;
exchange rate indices: the obvious similarity of exchange rate mo~ements relative
to the German mark in Figure la, which implies relatively fixed bílateral exchange
rates between these currencies in Figure 16, breaks down in Lhe ,oci;ur; half uf r.Lc
EMS period.
Additional evidence on the existence of a`soft currenc~ ~ ~,otiou ;r. the EMU' i~
provided in Figure 5 by the behaviour of exchange rates between the former
`currency snake` bloc: the initially relatively credibie exchanKe ratc pegs oí
Belgium and Denmark vis-a-vis Germany (gh,gd) and the Netherlands (nh,nd)
become non~redible as Belgium and Denmark switch to the `soft currency' option
of the EMS (box III). The inflationary consequences ot this polic~ shift are mosr
obvious from Figure 'la for Belgium: after 1982 inflation drifts awa~ from the (ow
German and Dutch levels and thereafter closely resembles the French ( and Danis},
inflation performances.-11-
The growing importance of the `hard currency` option of the EMS may also be
illustrated by referring to Figure 5: it is signalled by the increasingly credible
commitments of the Netherlands and Ireland towazds the German mark (gn,ge), in
particular in the post-1983 period of the EMS (boxes Ila and IIb). The outstanding
credibility of the Dutch-German (gn) exchange rate peg is thereby most obvious
when judged on the basis of the AC credibility measure in Figure 6, and in
particular in the late EMS period it is close to being perfect. This result suggests
that both countries aze already relatively close to a de facto monetary union. The
step toward Economic and Monetary Union with irrevocably fixed exchange rates
and hence perfectly credible pegs, as envisaged in stage 3 of the Delors plan (see
Table 1), may therefore only involve small credibility gains for the Netherlands.
Finally, Figure 5 reveals that the exchange rate commitment of the Banca
d'Italia is not credible (in the sense of MC~0.5) in any of the cases reported
(box IV). This low credibility is in general also confirmed by the AC credibility
measures in Figure 6, but here some evidence of increasingly credible pegs relative
to France, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland (h,ib,id,ie), the former 'soft currency`
bloc, is found for the late EMS period. This may signal a shift in the Italian
attitude towards the EMS and the tightening of the fluctuation margins of the
Italian lira to f3qo after January 1990 may further increase exchange rate
credibility. H u~ ~ I~ I
3.4. Exchange Rate Commitments, Policy Shifts and the'Lucas Critique`
So far it has been established that the EMS initially worked as a bipolar system
with a`hard` and a`soft' currency option and that policy switches between these
options appear to have occurred. Therefore, before being able to discuss the role of
exchange rate credibility in the EMS disinflations, it is necessary to analyse the
timing of shifts in the commitment of central banks to targeting their exchange
rates relative to these two currency blocs.
Since according to the `Lucas~ritique` the structural parameters of a model
change whenever the policy is changed, U-turns in exchange rate policies should
show up in the credibility measures. The estimates reported below search for the
most likely point in time at which such a policy shift occurred. Econometrically
this is done by applying `switching regression` analysis. The intuition behind this
method may be describc.d as follows: reczll that by def nition a policy shift irnplies
that the policy outcomes prior to such a U-turn are generated by a different policy
rule than those after the shift. Thus, the existence and the timing of a policy shift
may be detected by fitting separate models to the overall period and to both-12-
potential policy regimes at every possible policy shíft date and then selecting that
point in time for which the three models differ most drastically from one another.
Table 9 and Table 10 report the evidence from this exercise of estimating the most
likely time of a shift in the exchange rate commitment of central banks.
Summariaing this evidence, it can be stated that two major periods of change
in the EMS are identified. The eazly period of change is between the realignments
of June 1982 and March 1983, when the initially relatively credible pegs between
the former 'snake` participants Germany and the Netherlands on the one side and
Belgium and Denmark on the other side dissolve. At this time the `soft currency`
bloc with France at its centre and the `hard currency~ bloc linked to Germany are
established. The second major period of change in the EMS lies between the
realignment of April 1986 and the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of September 1987.
During this period Ireland shifts from the ~soft currency` option of pegging to the
French franc to adopting the 'hard currency` option of pegging to the German
mark. However, France has also increased its commitment to credibly pegging the
exchange rate relative to the German mazk,~s which in turn slightly reduced the
credibility of the formerly close French franc linkages of the smaller EMS
participants, in particular of Belgíum. In general, the results indicate that the
EMS, which initially operated as a bipolar system with a`hard` and a'soft` option,
has recently started to converge to a credible `hazd currency' standard.
The timing of the flrst round of policy switches, which established the bipolar
operating characteristics of the EMS, is indicated in the upper part of Table 7 for
those countries which had already participating in the European currency snake
system. A striking feature of these estimates, which are based on a sample
containing observations from both the snake and the EMS period (75M1-98M12)~~ iti
that all policy shifts occurred between the two realignments of June 1982
(gd,gn,nb) and March 1983 (gb,nd,bá7. The formerly credible commitments to
relatively fixed exchange rates between the three smaller `snake` pazticipants, in
particular the tight Benelux linkages, declined drastically. Furthermore, whilst the
Belgian and Danish monetary authorities dissolved their DM pegs, the Dutch
central bank after October 1982 moved towards credibly pegging the guilder to the
German mazk. This finding is consistent with the fact that the Nederlandsche
Bank towards the end of 1981 abolished target announcements for the national
liquidity ratio (M2 ~ net national product) in favour of gearing monetary policy
towazds a stable German mark exchange rate target.
Evidence on more recent policy shifts and the new tendency of the EMS to
converge to a'hard currency` option is provided in lower part of Table 7:
significant policy shifts towards credible German mark exchange rate policies-13-
occurred for Ireland in June 1986, two month~ prior to the large unilateral
devaluation (-8010) of the Irish pound in the EMS, and for France in September
1987, the month of the Basle-Nyborg Agreement of the EMS (see Table 1). The
Irish policy shift thereby has fallen into a period of policy consolidation, as
Dornbusch (1989) notes. It was initiated by the weakness of the Irish pound in the
EMS, which wa~s largely due to the Irish loss in competitiveness as a result oi the
sharp depreciation of the British pound, the currency of a major Irish trading
partner. The fact that the credibility estimates of the Irish Pound exchange rate
relative to both the German mark and the Dutch guilder increased significantly
after the policy shift supports the view of Dornbusch (1989) that the Irish pound
recently has become one of the hard EMS currencies. Contrarily, the French policy
shift in late 1987 increases French exchange rate credibility relative to the Gerrnan
mark only slightly. The fact that the policy switch occurred after the
Basle-Nyborg Agreement of September 1987, which expanded the role oí
inframarginal interventions and allowed for a wider use of the fluctuation bands,
suggests that enhanced French exchange rate credibility may partly be attributed
to the existence of better control procedures.
Finally, the credibility of the Italian central bank's commitment to fixed
exchange rates relative to Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium is found to have
decreased significantly after the large unilateral devaluation oí the Lira in July
1985. However, the credibility of the Italian French franc commitment at the most
likely policy switch in December 1986, just prior to the last general EMS
realignment, is the highest of all Italian estimates and has remained almost
constant. This suggests that the recent move of the French franc to becoming a
`hard currency` in the EMS may play a key role in process of future monetary
integration: it may provide a drifting anchor for 'weak` currency countries in
stage 1 of the transition to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).-14-
3.5. The Credibility of Interest Rate Tazgeting Policies
A closer look at monetary policy actions in EMS economies reveals that the central
banka uf the smaller EMS member states, in particular of the Netherlands,
Belgium and Ireland, have frequently and predominantly resorted to interest rate
targeting policies, as reflected for example by official discount rate changes.la It is
azgued here that in this case interest rate targeting policies may be adopted as an
operational procedure to control the exchange rate. This view, which is formalized
in a small model in Appendix A, assumes that domestic monetary policy is
primarily orientated towards keeping fixed exchange rates with a foreign country
in a system of adjustable exchange rate target bands. In this case foreign interest
rate movements combined with projections of potential exchange rate movements
within the band can be translated into a target corridor for the nominal interest
rate. However, given the above finding of a'soft currency' and a'hard currency`
option in the EMS, such interest rate targeting policies may not reduce the
inflationary bias of the economy, depending on which option is chosen.
The importance of interest rate targeting policies in the EMS is highlighted in
Figure 7a. Two key facts should be mentioned: first, the Dutch policy shift of
giving up the national liquidity target in favour of an exchange rate target relative
to the German mark after late 1981 is clearly reflected by the almost perfect
co-movements of both discount rates, which on most occasions were changed at
the same date. The small and relatively constant interest rate differential thereby
did not vanish until late 1989, which may explain the less than perfect credibility
of the Dutch German mark exchange rate peg from above. A second, perhaps more
important stylized fact from Figure 7a is the parallel development of discuunt rates
of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland after mid-1987 and of Denmark
after late-1989. The average correlation between EMS and German discount rates
thereby increases by about 35010 (from 0.53 to 0.72) between the intermediate and
late EMS period (83M4-86M12 versus 87M1-89M12). Note that thes~
`Euro-rounds` of discount rate changes signal the attempt of these central banks to
target their German mark exchange rates, which supports the hypothesis of a
convergence of the EMS to a`hazd currency` standard.
Is the initially bipolar EMS and its later convergence to a`hard currency`
standard also reflected in market interest rates? Figure 7b displays the behaviour
of nominal short-term money market interest rates in EMS countries. These-15-
short-term interest rates highlight an additional important aspect of the EMS:
three EMS sub-periods can be clearly identified. During the early EMS (1979-83)
highly volatile movements at relatively high average levels of interest rates in
France, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland are caused by speculative attacks on these
currencies and resulted in frequent unilateral realignments (see Table 1).
Disinflation, capital controls and policy adjustments in the deflation period
(1983-57) reduce this volatility drastically and put a downwazd trend on the
average levels of interest rates. The late EMS period (post-1987) is characterized
by relatively parallel movements of interest rates and a marked increase of all rates
after 1988. This visual impression of an increasing harmonization of interest rate
movements is also reflected in the average correlation between EMS money market
interest rates, which initially rose only slightly from 0.36 (79M3,83M3) to 0.41
(83M4,86M12), but recently jumped to 0.63 (87M1~9M12). With respect to the
functioning of the EMS the ~small DM~one' hypothesis again appeazs to be
consistent with the data. Furthermore, the fact that the Belgian, Danish and Irish
interest rates during the disinflation period (1983,87) more closely followed French
as opposed to German interest rates points towards the existence of a~soft
currency' bloc in the EMS.
Having described some stylized facts about interest rates behaviour in the
EMS, the results from the empirical evaluation of the credibility of interest rate
targeting policies may now be summarized as follows: the interest rate targeting
policies of the smaller EMS economies Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and
Ireland possessed short-term credibility but lacked long-terne credibility. Whilst
discount rate changes could effectively be used by the public to forecast
movements in short-term money mazket rates, these signals had little relevance for
predicting the behaviour of long-term government bond rates. This result ma.y be
interpreted as evidence on a lack of credibility of anti-inflation policies in the
long-run since under zero expected inflation short-term and long-term rates should
move closely together and hence be equally responsive to the policy signal. 'I'his
view is supported by the fact that for the EMS period, in particular in its early
phase, the highest long run credibility is found for Germany and the Netherlands,
which both had the lowest EMS inflation record.
Figure 8 displays these results graphically. With the onset of the EMS the
short-term interest rate targeting policies of Denmark, Belgium and the
Netherlands beeome credible (in the sense of MC~0.5) and remain it throughout
the EMS period. Credible short-term interest rate targeting are found for the
United Kingdom in all three sub-samples and for Ireland in the pre-EMS
(72M4-79M2) and post-1983 EMS period (83M3,89M12). This suggests that in-16-
particular the central banks of these smaller EMS member countries have been
able to credibly signal their short-term monetary policy intentions through
discount rate innovations and that these signals have influenced interest rate
expectations to a large extent. However, this is not true for the Italian and even
less for the German or French monetary authorities, which during the EMS period
did not issue credible interest rate signals. This result for France is not surprising
because the low information content of the French discount rate during the EMS
period results from the fact that this rate has not been altered since August 1977.
The low credibility estimate thus reflects the policy shift from interest rate
targeting to monetary quantity targeting by the Banque de France in early 1977 as
pazt of the stabilizat.ion efforts under the Barre plan. For Germany the sharp
decline in the credibility of discount rate announcements for money market rates
after 1979 is consistent with the view expressed in Neumann (1988) that the
Bundesbank during the 1980s has targeted money market interest rates more
directly by influencing interest rates on short-term treasury bills.
A final point to be discussed here is whether or not the onset of the EMS has
had a significant impact on the credibility of interest rate targeting policies. The
est.imates of the rnost likely pOlicy switchea for t.he lxist-197~i perirxi are mpcirt.e~l
in Table 8. The key result from 'Pable 8 is that most (5 out of 7) policy shifts in
EMS countries occurred in the early EMS (79M3-83M2) period, frequently f two
months around the realignment dates. This suggests that interest rate targeting
policies in the EMS may have predominantly been orientated towards stabilizing
exchange rate fluctuations within the band.
Summarízing, it may be stated that the smaller EMS countries appear to have
adopted more credible interest rate tazgeting policies than the larger EMS
countries. This indicates the attempt of small EMS countries to gear their
monetazy policies more toward pegging the exchange rate through interest rate
targeting policies, whilst the larger EMS countries have had a stronger tendency
towazds more independent policies.-17-
3.6. PoGcy Commitments and the EMS Disinflations
Having established that the EMS initially worked as a bipolar system with a`hard`
and a`soft` currency option, the'borrowing reputation` hypothesis of Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1987) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) no longer automatically
implies a`deflationary bias' of the EMS. Depending on whether exchange rates are
credibly pegged to a`hard' or a'soft` centre country, policymakers in EMS
economies may borrow a'good' or a`bad` counterinflation reputation. Can this
explain the differential EMS disinflation experience in a more satisfactory way
than the existing literature? Summarizing the discussion below it can be stated
that that the `soft` and the 'hard' option largely account for the differential
disinflation experience in EMS member countries. Recently the French
commitment towards the `hard` option has increased, pulling the others along. At
the same time the German `hard` stance has mellowed, which has rendered the
fixed parities more credible and prevented reflation from emerging as strongly as it
has outside the system.
Germany is found to have established and maintained a high counterinflation
reputation through consistently low inflation períormances (see Figure 2a). The
inflationary impact of the 1979 oil price shock in Germany was relatively small and
inflation rose from about 301o in early 1979 to about 7qo in late 1981. During 1982
to late 1986 inflation fell more or less continuously to just below OoI'o, but between
eazly 1987 and late 1989 reflation to about 3.5qo emerged again. The German
success in controlling and containing inflation could thereby not be attributed to
the use of any particularly credible monetary policy instrument. This may be due
to the publicly acknowledged policy stance of the German Bundesbank of not
strictly adhering to any particular policy rule, but to adopt whatever policy
measures appear adequate at the time in order to achieve the prime policy target
oí low inffation rates
French anti-inflation reputation is found to have been low and remained
relatively low throughout the EM5 due to its higher inflation performance.
Double-digit inflation rates persisted throughout 1979 to early 1983, and the
stringent austerity programme adopted after the March 1983 realignment (see
Table 1) succeeded in bringing inflation down to 3~Io in late 1987. The widespread
adoption of foreign exchange controls thereby allowed France to circumvent many
of the disciplinary effects of fixed exchange rates and enabled policymakers to
effectively pursue an independent monetazy policy. Deflation in France was
therefore largely homemade. Finally note that after 1987 French inflation remained
virtually constant at 3qo and that a convergence of inflation rates between-ls-
Germany and France is achieved by a rise of German inflation! This suggests that
the recent convergence of the EMS to a`hard currency' standard has involved two
elements: France has belatedly embraced the `hard` option, whilst Germany has
slightly mellowed its 'hard` stance. The result is a more stable system with less
tensions but also with less inflation discipline.
Given the reputation of both major EMS countries for being `hard` or `soft`
about inflation, the smaller EMS members were in principle free to choose amongst
these alternative deflation scenarios offered by EMS membership. Which outcome
for inflation may be predicted from the above estimates of policy shifts in the
exchange rate commitment of the EMS economies?
The Netherlands entered the EMS with inflation rates only slightly above the
levels of Germany. By late 1982 the Dutch central bank increases the credibility of
its commitment to the German mark exchange rate and the positive inflation
differential disappears (see Figure 2a). Throughout the remaining EMS period
inflation closely follows that of Germany and counterinflation reputation in both
countries is about equally high. The Dutch disinflation process during the EMS
period may therefore be explained by the hypothesis of `borrowing reputation' from
the German Bundesbank via credible exchange rate policies. The fact that the
highly credible discount rate announcements by the Nederlandsche Bank are
consistently issued as a direct reaction to German discount rate alterations thereby
largely enhances the credibility of its exchange rate commitment.
Belgium, which maintained a very close bilateral exchange rate linkage with
the Netherlands during the European currency snake system, also entered the EMS
with inflation rates only slightly above those of Germany. However, in June 1982
the Belgian policy shift from credibly pegging to the Dutch guilder (and hence
indirectly to the German mark) to adopting the `sott currency` option of credibly
pegging to the French franc results in a rise of inflation to French levels.
Thereafter Belgium and France experienced similar inflation performances and
macroeconomic policies, which were dominated by direct price and wage controls
and attempts to reduce the inflationary impacts of automatic wage indexation
schemes. However, despite the decline in Belgium inflation during 1983-86, there
was almost no convergence to the also declining German and Uutch inflation rates.
The 'soft currency` option of credibly pegging to the French franc in connection
with the higher French inflation rates explains why Belgium despite its gain in
counterinflation reputation could not disinflate more quickly. Recently Belgium
has increased its commitment to level pegging the German mark exchange rate and
started participating in the so~alled `Euro-rounds` of discount rate policy. As-19-
a result inflation converged and closely follows German inflation rates in the
post-1987 period.
Denmazk, the third partner ín the 'soft currency` bloc, also entered the EMS
with inflation rates lower than those in France. Inflation then jumped to French
levels as a result oí the second oil price shock just after the onset of the EMS and
remained there for some time. During the deflation period 1982-1986 the inflation
performances of Denmark and Belgium are almost identical and macroeconomic
policies were also orientated towards wage de-indexation. The slow Danish
disinflation may therefore also be explained by the existence of the `soft currency`
option. However, unlike in Belgium a recent policy shift towards the `hard' option
is less obvious from the data for Denmark. Denmazk appears to have not
participated in the co-ordinated discount rate policies and its inflation rate was
consistently higher than French inflation in the post-1987 period.
The Irish disinflation experience was different from that of Belgium and
Denmark. First the inflationary impact of the oil price increase in Ireland was
massive. After a slight decline in 1980-81 Irish disinflation started in 1982 with the
adoption of an austerity and fiscal consolidation programme. Tight tïscal policies
and not taking advantage of the two EMS realignments in 1982 helped Ireland to
reduce inflation írom 19qo in late 1981 to French levels of 9qo by mid 1983.
Between 1983 and early 1986 fiscal consolidation largely eliminated budget deficits
and Irish inflation declined slowly along with French inflation rates. Throughout
this time, credibly pegged exchange rates relative to the `soft currency` bloc in the
EMS were maintained. After the mid-1986 weakness of the Irish pound in the EMS
a switch to the `hard currency` option of pegging credibly to the German mark was
initiated and despite the reflationazy impact of the drastic devaluation (-8qo) of
the Irish pound in August 1986 Irish inflation declined to the relatively low levels
of Germany and the Netherlands by late 1989. The recent move of Ireland to
participating 5n the so~a,lled `Euro rounds` of discount rate innovations, which
closely followed interest rate policies in Germany, in combination with the high
credibility of the Irish discount rate signa] provided the credibility for the new
policy stance of containing inflation.
Finally, for Italy no credible form of intermediate monetary targeting could be
detected. Whilst the Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) hypothevis that for it,aly
exchange rate targets have been more credible than monetary targeting is found to
be true, this does not imply that exchange rate targets have been credible. In fact,
all Italian EMS exchange rate commitments have been non-credible, and this
finding is consistent with the trend movements of most Italian bilateral exchange
rates throughout the EMS period. The most credible form of intermediate-20-
monetazy targeting found for Italy is interest rate targeting, suggesting that the
banca d'Italia has orientated its monetary policy primarily towazds the discount
rate. These relatively credible policy of discount rate targeting has, however, not
been implemented in a way consistent with fixed exchange rates, as indicated by
the still prevailing interest rate and inflation differentials with the remaining EMS
countries.
4. Policy Implications
During the deflation period 1983-86 macrceconomic policies in Belgium, Denmark
and Ireland were geared towards controlling price and wage inflation and these
stabilization policies appear to have been supplemented by the attempt to keep
exchange rates closely pegged to the French franc rather than the German rnark,
which was closely targeted only by the Netherlands. Recent policy shifts, initiated
during the years 1986-~37, clearly go towards the `hard currency` option. Which
benefits and policy options arise from this new `hard` EMS for the futuré!
A potential gain from a'hard` EMS is that credible exchange rate pegging
policies in connection with the high counterinflation reputation of the German
Bundesbank will help to contain inflation. This `credibility bonus` from EMS
membership provided the main motivation behind the long awaited British ERM
entry in October 1990. Two points should be mentioned in this context: first, the
fluctuation margins of the British pound (f6 010) may be too wide for establishing a
credible exchange rate peg and joining the EMS may only invoke a weak
deflationary bias for the United Kingdom, as has been found above for Italy in the
first decade of the EMS. Second, like the French franc in the early EMS, the
British pound may provide a new `so[t` anchor, which may destabilize the system if
countries switch to level pegging policies relative Lo a`weak` British pound.
The new `hard` EMS furthermore provides favourable starting conditions for
the transition to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as proposed in the Delors
plan. Moving ahead to monetary union with irrevocably fixed exchange rates will
give the `hard` EMS the exchange rate credibility that it currently still lacks.
However, under perfectly credible exchange ratcs in a monetary union the
credibility of anti-inflation policies in the new EMU system will largely depend on
the status and design of the new community institutions. Thereby the new
European system of central banks, `EuroFed`, will not be able to proGt from the
German Bundesbank's counterinflation reputation; it must establish reputation-21-
independently after having started its operation. Therefore inflation control should
be a binding policy goai, and the constitutional status of the low-inflation
objective must be supplemented by institutional rules which make the achievement
of low inflation incentive-compatible for policy-makers.
Finally, there is a serious possibility that the 'hard' EMS may be undermined
by continuing inflationazy developments in Germany as a result of the German
unification process, which aze likely to erode the counterinflation reputation of the
Bundesbank. In order to avoid such inflationary impacts of German unification on
the EMS, a relatively quick transition to stage three of EMU in the Delors plan
may be desirable. In this case the 'EuroFed` will in the neaz future have to succeed
the Bundesbank in providing the system with a credible low-inflation anchor.
Jumping into monetary union may help the 'EuroFed` to establish its
counterinflation reputation quickly, in pazticulaz as a prolonged period of increased
policy coordination in stage two will not help the `EuroFed` to gain anti-inflation
reputation since the rules of the system are changed again in stage three.
Therefore, if all ERM member countries agree that inflation control is the prime
monetary policy objective and that the new community institutions will be
successful in containing inflation, they should give the 'EuroFed` a vote of
confidence by putting the system into operation.-22-
Anpendix A: Credibilityand Reputation in Models of Policy Games
The basic model of monetazy policy games, as borrowed from Cukierman (1986),
assumes that the monetary authority and the public aze engaged in a policy game
which determines the equilibrium level of output and inflation. Inflation is amonetary
phenomenon (1.1) and output is determined by a Lucas-type supply function (1.2).19
The central banker's objective function - possibly identical to the social welfare
function - assumes that he dislikesinflation ~ri and likes economic stimulus, defined by
a level of output y~ above its natural level y" (1.3 or 1.4 in terms of m). The public's
move in the game is to form expectations which are defined to be of the least-squares
error type (1.6) and are assumed to be formed rationally on the basis of all available
information in equation (1.7).20 As a result, the optimal rate of inflation or monetary
expansion under discretionazy policy-making and rational expectations is some
positive constant b~, which characterizes the inflationary bias of the Nash solution of
the policy game in (1.4). The temptation ofpolicy-makers to aim at the unsustainable
f`irst-best solution (with m~-b~ and Emt ~ St~-1-0) drives the economy away from the
second-best incentive incompatible solution (mt-Em~~l2t-1-0) to the inferior but
stable third-best Nash solution (m~-Em~ ~ 52~.~-b~). Note that rates of inflation lower
than b~, say zero, are only achievable if the monetary authority can issue a credible
commitment to zero inflation, i.e viaa constitutional amendment.
Alternative ways of introducing credibility or reputation into the above one-shot
game azise when the game is played repeatedly, as demonstrated by Barro and Gordon
(1983a,b). In infinitely repeated full information games the second-best solution
A stylized version ofthe basicstatic modelofmonetary policy games
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(mt-Emt~ftt-1-0) may be sustained by reputational forces which operate through
credible threats and preJspecified punishment strategies on the side of the public.
These essentially arbitrazy trigger mechanisms, however, imply no empirically
testablehypotheses with respect totheconcept ofreputation.21 Empirically meaningfuI
concepts ofcredibility and reputation aze only derived in policy games with imperfect
information, as discussed below.
A prominent finite horizon monetary policy game with incomplete information is
the sequential equilibrium model of Backus and Driffill (1985), which is described in
equations (2.1) to (2.7). The important feature of this informational game is that the
public faces two potential types ofpolicy-maker, with preferences described in (2.3a)
and (2.3b), and is uncertain as to which typeof policy-maker is in office until the end of
the game in a known terminal period r. This uncertainty in connection with strategic
behaviour (disguise) on the part of the policy-maker prevents the public from inferring
the true state of the central bankers' preferences from the observable money growth
process. This is formalized in equations (2.5a) and (2.5b) by noting that the
observation of zero money growth may be due to the move of a'hazd-nosed`
policy-maker who always plays mt-0 with probability one, but may also represent the
move of a`wet` policy-maker who disguises as a'hard-nosed` one with a time-varying
probability ~it,. Consequently the public's rational expectation of money growth in
(2.7) is given by the expectation of the discretionary outcome b~ multiplied by the
joint probability that the policy-maker is `wet` (1-~it) and does not disguise as a
`hard-nosed` one (1-ót). Reputation in the sense of Backus and Driffill is thereby a
Reputation in astyGzed Backusand Driífll (1985)
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state variable, conceived as the subjective probability ~, that the central banker is a
non-inflationazy `conservative` type. This probability is updated continuously via
Bayesian probability learning.
A second prominent policy game model with incomplete information is given in
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a,b). The important feature of the Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986a,b) model is that a combination of incomplete monetary control (3.5a)
in connection with gradually and persistently changing policy objectives btin (3.3)
prevents the public from inferring the true state of the central banker's preferences
from the actual money growth process. However, central bank watching gradually
reveals the unobservable state of the policymaker's preferences since it provides
information on the degree of monetazy noise attributed to the shifting policy
objectives. In Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) the central bank is furthermore
assurred to issue a noisy monetary announcement signal (3.5b), which is treated by the
public as one piece of contemporary information that, if credible, is used in forming
expectations in (3.7).22
Credibility inaatylizedCukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model
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Twomeasures oí credibility are proposed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b): average
credibility (AC- - ~ m~Emt ~ S2c ~) is conceived as the extent to which the public's
rational expectations (Emt~S2t) of current planned money growth (mg) deviate from
the current monetary announcement (m~). Marginal credibility (MC) is defined as the
extent to which a unit change in the announcement (m~) affects the public's money
growth expectations (Emt~ S2t) and may be thought of as the weight (cr) placed on the
announcement in thepublic's expectations ïormation process in (3.6).
In order to evaluate the credibility of the official interest (discount) rate
announcements the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model can be modifiedasoutlined
in equations (4.1) to (4.7). Short-run inflation control is exercised through open
market operations and causes deviations of the nominal interest rate (it) from the real
interest rate (in) in equation (4.1). Given the gradual changes in the policy-maker's
preferences (4.3) and the imprecise control ofthe monetary authority over the market
determined interest rate in (4.5a), the public is uncertain about the true planned level
of interest rate (ig). To reduce this uncertainty the policy-maker is assumed to issue a
noisy interest rate announcement signal (4.5b) in addition to the information derived
by the public from observing past interest rates. The public treats the announcement
as contemporary information which, if credible, is used forming expectations in (4.7).
As before, this defines average credibitity (AC- -~ i~-Eic ~ S2t ~) and marginal
credibility (MC-a).
Credibility in aatylized model forinterest rates
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In the field of exchange rate policy the commitment of policymakers to fixed but
adjustable exchange rates may also be judged on the basis of the average or marginal
credibility ofthe official central parity announcement, as is outlined in equations (5.1)
to (5.7). The nominal exchange rate ( Et) in equation (5.1) is assumed to be determined
by a purchasing power parity condition. This allows thecentral bank ofthe small open
economy to implement inflation control by pegging its bilateral exchange rate Et with
the foreign country, which is assumed to have zero inflation (x"`). As before the
policymaker is assumed to like economic stimulus (yt-yo) and to dislike inflation ( at),
here equivalent to deviations of the exchange rate ( Et) from its long-run purchasing
power parity level ( E~).23 This allows the average credibility (AC- - ~ E~EEt ~ S2t ~) and
marginal credibility (MC-a) of the central bank's exchange rate commitment to be
measured.
Credibility in aatylized model forexchange rates
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Appendix B: Tbe Empirical Implementation of Reputation and Credibility
Reputation is defined as the probability that policy-makers consistently pursue an
low-inflation policy. In this paper this probability is derived by applying the
Bayesian multi-process Kalman filter, which is outlined in detail in an appendix of
Weber (1988). In principle this signal extraction algorithm computes inflation
forecasts as a probability weighted average of four alternative forecasting models.
The first two models assume inflation to be a stationary stochastic process,
generated by a combination of transitory and permanent price level shocks, whilst
the remaining two models allow inflation rat~ to exhibit permanent shocks or
trend movements. At each point in time each model has a certain probability,
which in the Bayesian part of the multi-process Kalman filter is calculated as a
combination of prior information and sample information derived from the
forecasting performance of the iadividual models over the most recent periods.
This probability is thereby updated by using Bayes' law, which in Backus and
Driffill (1985) is employed to derive the counterinflation reputation measure. The
empirical counterpart to this reputation measure is derived here as the probability
that inflation rates followed relatively stationary time-paths. For an exact
formalization of this approach and a discussion of the estimating equations the
analysis in Weber (1988) is referred to.
In order to derive an empirical counterpart to the credibility measures from
Appendix A, the modelling of the public's expectations formation process is
required. In the present study a two-step approach is adopted: first the optimal
time series expectations of the unobservable planned policy targets conditional on
past information (Emg~S2~-1i Eig~f2~-~, Ecg~l2t-i) aze derived by using signal
extraction methods. Second, the rational expectations of these policy targets under
incomplete contemporary information (Em~ ~ Sl~, Eig ~ Sli, Ec~ ~ S2i) are derived by
incorporating the current announcement into the above time series expectations by
using least-squares regression.
In implementing the money growth, interest rate and exchange rate
expectations conditional on past information a time series model for these policy
variables is required. The theoretical models in Appendix A imply the time series
models (6.la,b) and (6.2a,b) for the actual observable policy outcomes
(x~-{mt,it,E~}) and the policy announcements (x~-{m~,i~,c~}) respectively, but for
the purpose of an empirical evaluation a slightly modified version of these dynamic
lineaz models has been employed.24 By applying the multi-process Kalman filter the
optimal predictions from these time series models were calculated and used as
input for the rational expectations equation (6.4). These rational expectations were-28-
Time Series Model for Observabte Policy Outoome xc-{mt,ic,c~}:
xc - x~ f ~c ,
x~ - Pxi-t-} 7c ,
~c-l~c~c, Efc~~c-c-0, E(~c~c)~~c-~-~~
7c-~c~F~i, E7c ~~c-i-~, E(7c7c) ~~c-~-v7
(ó.la)
(6.ib)
Time Series Model for Policy Announoement x~-{m~,i~,c~}:
x~ - xi f~c , 4h,-uclri, E~c ~~c-i-0, E(4h.~c) ~~c-c-o~ (6.2a)
xg - Oxi-i -} 7t , 7c-vc~l~i, E7c~~c-i-~, E(7c7c)~~c-i-ay (6.2b)
Optimal Prediction of Planned Policy under Past Information 12i-I:
Ex~~Stc-i - BExc~(xc-i,xc-z,-..) t (1-B) Ex~~(x~-vx~`-z,--~) (6.3)
Optimal Prediction of Planned Policy under Contemporary Information f2c:
Exg ~ Stc - a x~ t(1-a) Ex~ ~ Stc-c (6.4)
Influence of Announoement on Expectations under Contemporary Information:
E(x~-Exg ~ S2c-i) I~c - a(x~-Exg I Stc-i) (6.5)
derived as the fitted values of a least-squares regression of the actual observable
policy outcome (xc-{mc,ic,et}) on the policy announcements (x~-{m~,i~,c~}) and
on the expected policy outcome conditional on past information (Exg~f2t-1), which
in principle may be calculated by iterating B in the weighted average of the two
univariate time series expectations from (6.3) between zero and one and selecting
that value of B which minimizes the overall sum of squared residuals of the
regression equation. Since all three types of announcements are low frequency
signals, that is change infrequently, the information content of past announcements
is typically found to be very low and B is close to one in many cases.25 Consequently,
for the results discussed in this paper the restriction ~I was imposed and the
influence of the announcement on expectations was estimated directly from
equation (6.5), which states that the change in expectations due to new
information is proportional to the unexpected component (x~ExQ ~ f2c-~) of the
current announcement signal. The proportionality factor a thereby represents the
marginal credibility measure.
In the empirical analysis average credibility (AC- -~ x~-Exc~S2c ~) will be
quantified in a slightly different form to take into account that announcements are
frequently made in the form of target ranges of width wc. Average credibility is
measured as the period average of AC- wc-~ x~Exc~f2c ~, which is the width of
the band adjusted for the expected absolute announcement bias. This measure is
highest if announcements correspond to prior expectations and may become
negative if the band is not binding.-29-
Apnendix C: Data Descriptions
The paper uses monthly data, except for consumer prices, which aze both monthly
and quarterly. The data definitions and data sources aze indicated below.
Quarterly data used in this paper:
PRICES
consumer price indicee IMF InternationalFinancinlStatistics, line 64,





















calculated as cross-rates from US dollar rates, taken
from IMF lnternational Financia!Statástics, line rf.
Eurostatistics.
IMF Internntiona!Financia!Statistics, line 64,
exception: for Ireland data on wholesale price
indices from IMF lnternationalFánancialStatistács,
line 63, were ttsed.
IMF lnternationalFánancialStatistics, line 60b,
exceptions: for Ireland data from
OECD Main Economic lndicatorswere used.
IMF lnternationalFinancialStatástics, line 61.
OECD Main Economic Indácators,
exception: for the United Kingdom London
money market cleazing rates were used.
OECD Main Economic lndicators.
IMF International FánancialStatistics, line 14.
OECD Main Economic Indácators, index
(1985-100) of seasonally adjusted money.
OECD Main Economic lndicators, index
(1985-100) of seasonally adjusted quasi money.
~ECD Main Economic Indicators.
taken from Neumann (1988).
taken from Wyplosz (1988).
taken from OECD Country Suruey: ltaly,
various volumes.
M3 United Kingdom taken from Fischer (1988).
Data of 1989 and 1990 are taken for all countries from Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis International Economic Condátions, various issues.-30-
Footnotes
~ See Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) and the survey of Wyplosz (1990) on this point.
2 See for example Cukierman (1986), p. 8, in his discussion of the Backus and Driffill
(1985) model.
3 For a more formal definition of reputation see the stylized version of the Backus
and Driffill (1985) model in Appendix A.
4 Only the latter case is of interest here since binding commitments, such as
constitutional amendments, per definition imply perfect credibility. Credibility may
thus also be viewed as a measure of the degree to which policymakers ~tie the hands~
on future policies by issuing policy target announcements.
5 For a more formal de6nition of these two credibility measures see the stylized
version of the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986b) model in Appendix A.
6 Appendix A presents a model for the credibility of exchange rate announcements.
~ See also Appendix A for a model of the credibility of interest rate announcements.
s The paper focuses only on the period averages of these recursively updated
probabilities, which are estimated by applying the Bayesian multi process Kalman
filter, as outlined in detail in Weber (1988). See Appendix B for a further discussion.
9 This section draws on Weber (1988) and presents updated quarterly estimates.
to The paper only reports estimates which deal with announcements on each of these
three monetary policy instruments separately, since this allows [or an intuitively
appealing interpretation of the results. Combining the information from these
announcements in a general monetary policy reaction function and relating their
relative credibility more directly, for example via a demand for money function, to
the credibility of the central banks' monetary policy stance clearly is the next step.
Unfortunately, such estimates are difficult to interpret since the relative magnitude
of the credibility effects and money supply and demand elasticities cannot be
distinguished.
11 This section draws on Weber (1990a) and presents updated estimates. For further
details of these estimates see Appendix B and the discussion in Weber (1990a).
12 Boissieu (1988), p. 66.
13 See Appendix B, in paricular equation (6.4), for this feature of the MC estimate.
14 This statement applies when the significa,nce oí the decline in credibility is judged
on the basis of f2 standard errors of the MC measure from the Bretton Woods
period. Tables containing these estimates, which are not reported here, are available
on request.-31-
ls The Smithonian agreement of the 'Group of Ten' of December 1971 widened the
bilateral fluctuation margins against the íJ.S. dollar from t1ol'o to t2.25qo. In the
Basle agreement of April 1972 the central banks of the EC countries Germany,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg agreed on narrower
bilateral fluctuation margins of f1.125QIo (f0.75qo between the Netherlands and the
Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, BLUE) around their spot parities. In this
`snake in the tunnel` arrangement the narrow bilateral mazgins (the `snake`) were
equal to half the size of the U.S. dollar mazgins (the `tunnel'). In May 1972 Denmark,
the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the snake, but the latter two countries
withdrew from both the snake and the tunnel in June 1972. Denmark withdrew from
the snake in June 1972, but rejoined in October 1972. Italy left the snake ín February
1973 and in March 1973 the remaining snake countries decided to let their currencies
float jointly against the U.S. dollar, which terminated the period of the `snake in the
tunnel`. France withdrew from the system in January 1974 (French sample
72M4-73M12) rejoined in July 1975 but withdrew again in March 1976. The sample
period considered here for the European currency snake system covers both the
`snake' and the `snake in the tunnel' and runs from April 1972 to February 1979 with
the exceptions indicated above.
ls For France this shiít towards a credible German mark commitment is not
indicated by Figure 5. This is due to the fact that the arbitrarily chosen late EMS
period (87M1,89M12) contains, as shown in Table 7, a significant structural break,
which results in a biased MC estimate.
17 The more turbulent exchange rate episodes of the `snake in the tunnel` and the
early snake period aze excluded from the sample since they strongly bias the results
toward structural breaks in 1973 or early 1974.
18 The calendazs of main economic events in monetary policies from the OECD
Country Surveys: NeUaerlands, Belgium and lreland, vazious issues, clearly reflect
this fact.
19 Note that here unexpected inflation rates A~ ( a~-p~-Pt-1), instead of unexpected
price levels as in Lucas (1973), explain the deviatiou of output from its natural level.
20 Since the public cannot observe mt and there are no contemporary information
signals available, Emi ~ f2~ is identical to Em~ ~ S2t-i in this simple version of the basic
game.
Zi Also note that these reputational equilibria unravel backwazds in finitely repeated
games with the full information and the above discretionary Nash equilibrium
(m~-Em~ ~ ft~-1-b~) is obtained in all periods.-32-
~ Note that the ccefficients po and ui in the reduced form for the optimal money
growth rate (3.4c) are determined by the requirement of rational expectations in the
solution of the public's signal extraction problem (3.5). See Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986b) for the details of these coefficient restrictions.
~ In fixed but adjustable exchange rate systems like the EMS a realignment
typically leads to new exchange rate parities which are the outcome of a bazgaining
proceas amongst the participants and frequently are not fully indexed to the
cumulated past inflation differentials. This fact justifies the formulation in (5.3)
according to which a central bank's PPP target of the exchange rate c~ may differ
from the officially announced new central exchange rate parity ca.
24 In pazticulaz I assume p-1 and allow the changes in policy-makers objectives ry~
to follow a nonstationary process by replaying ryt by ry~`-ry~ts~, where s~ is
determined by a random walk s~-sr-~~-w~, Ewi~S2r-~-0, E(wiwi')~SZ~-~-oWz, which
adds a third equation to (6.la,b) and (6.2a,b).
25 See Weber ( 1990a) for further details on these estimates.-33-
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Tab. 1: EMS Realignments and Selected PoGcy Changes Signalling a Move
Towazds More Deflationary Policies in EMS Member Countrie~
1979 Maz. 13 EMS: eschange rate mechanism (ERM) starts to operate;
initial currency weigh~ts in ECU currency basket:
DM 32.OoI'o, FF 19.0`10, UKL 15.Oo1'o, LIT 10.2010, Hfl lO.lol'o,
Bf 8.5oI' o, Dkr 2.?oI' o, Dra 1.3qo, IRL 1.2oI'o
Sep. 24 EMS: realignment (DM f2qo, Dkr -2.99'0)
Nov. 30 EMS: realignment (Dkr -11.8e1o)
Denmark: short-term price and wage freeze
1981 Mar. 9 Belg~'an-Luxembour~ Economic Union (BLEU): convention
for BLEU (fixed parity without bands) renewed for 10 years
Maz. 22 EMS: realignment (LIT ~qo)
Italy: government spending cut plans
Jul. Italy: Banca d'Italia freed from the obligation to purchase
unsold public debt at the Treasury auctions, which gave the
government preferential access to monetizing fiscal deficits
July Netherlands: the Nederlandsche Bank abandons control of
domestic liquidity and gears its monetary policy towards the
external constraint,in particular the DM exchange ~ rate
Oct. 5 EMS: realignment (DM f5.5Qlo, FF -3010, LIT -3"70, Hfl -}.3.5P1o)
France: temporary price and profit freeze
1982 Feb. 22 EMS: realignment (Bf ~.5qo, Dkr -3qo)
Belgium: general príce treeze until end of March, selective
freeze thereafter; freeze of wage indexation (until May);
also longer-run measures to impede complete wage indexation
Mar. 25 Ireland: tight budget by Fianna Fail government; initiation
of an austerity and fiscal consolidation progr~amme
June 14 EMS: realignment (DM t4.25oI'o, FF -5.750l0, LIT -2.75010,
Hfl i-4.25qo)
France: temporary freeze of prices, wages, rents and divi-
dents until October; reduction in 1983 budget deficit plans
June 23 Italy: announcement of budgetary austerity measures
Oct. 21 Ireland: proposal for elimination of budget deficits by 1986
Oct. 16 Denmark: comprehensive stabilization package: automatic wage
indexation suspended; wage freeze until March 1983; tight
fiscal policy; progressive dismanteling of capital controls;
Dec. 30 Belgium: selective price freeze extended until end of 1983;
wage restraint (flat rate indexation) until the end of 1984
1983 Maz. 21 EMS: realignment ( DM f5.5o1'0, FF -2.510, LIT -2-5010, Hfl
~-3.5Q1o, Bf f1.5oI'o, Dkr f2.5qo, IRL -2.5oI'o)
Mar. 28 France: stringent austerity programme aiming at bringing down
inflation via monetary restraint, restoring external balanccs
via foreign exchange controls and reducing the public budget
deficit by cutting expenditures and raising taxPs
Apr. 12 Denrnark: govcrnment announces further liberalization of
capital movements to take place on May 1
April Denmark: government guidelines for an upper-limit of 2~o for
the annual wage increase in the new two-year wage agreement
DecemberEEC: target dates for the expiry of capital restrictions set
for France (end of 1986) Italy and Ireland (end of 1987) in
order to allow for a gradual relaxation of the controls-36-
1984 Sep. 17 EMS: revision of currency weights in ECU currency basket
(DM 32.Oq, FF 19.Oq, UKL 15.OQI'o, LIT 10.2Q1o, Nfl l0.l010,
Bf 8.510, Dkr 2.7q, DRA 1.3oI'o, IRL 1.201'0)
1985 Jan. 1 France: start of a two-year transition oí monetary policy
operating procedures from quantitative credit controls to
a more market-based syatem of rcwervc mquirements
Maz. 12 EMS: Council of Central Bank Covernors decides on a
package to strengthen role of the ECU in the EMS
April Denmark: government enforces a 2PIo legal upper-limit for
the annual wage increase in the new two-year wa ~ ge agreement
July 22 EMS: realignment (DM f2ol'o, FF f2olo, LIT -~"1o Hfl f2olo,
BL -f2o1o, Dkr ~-2qo, IRL ~-2qo~
July Italy: announcement of revenue raising measures to contain
the increase in the budget deficit
Italy: modification of wage indexation mechanism, scala mobile
1986 February EEC: European Single Act sets 31. December 1992 as target
date for completion of internal market with free movements
oí goods, persons, services and capital
Apr. 7 EMS: realignment (DM i-3oI'o, FF -3~10, Hfl f3o1o, Bf f1ol'o,
Dkr flolo)
France: steps to slow nominal wage growth; plans to reduce
government budget deficit; relaxation of exchan e controls
June Denmark: wage indexation law (suspended 1982~ is abolished
Aug. 4 EMS: realignment ( IRL ,SoI'o)
Ireland: sharp monetazy tightening to offset the destabi-
lizing effects of the British pound sterling weakness
1987 Jan.12 EMS: realignment (DM f3olo, Hfl f3oïo, Bf f2ol'o, Dkr -F2o7o)
Sep. 12 EMS: Basle-Nyborg Agreement of the Committee of Central
Bank Governors to strengthen the exchange rate mechanism
of the EMS; measures include a wider use of fluctuation
bands, an extension of the very short-run financing faci-
lities and the use of ECU for inframarginal intervention
1989 Apr. 17 EMS: Delors Committee Report proposes a three stage
transition to Economic and Monetary Union:
stage 1 extention of ERM to all EMS member countries,
reduction of fluctuation bands to narrow range,
infrequent realignments subject to mutual agreement,
full capital mobility
stage 2 creation of new Community institution, increasing
co-ordination of national monetary policies
stage 3a irrevocably fixed exchange rates without bands,
new Community institutions (EuroFed) functioning
stage 3b single currency monetary union at a later date
June 19 EMS: Spain enteres the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS
with a wide fluctuation margin of fóolo
June 27 EMS: European Council decision to enter the 1. stage oí EMU
from the Delors Committee Report on 1 July 1990
Sep. 21 EMS: revision of currency weights in ECU currency basket
(DM 30.1qo, FF 19.Oq, UKL 13.OoI'o, LIT 10.15010, Hfl 9.4QI'o, Bf
7.901'0, PES 5.3oI'o, Dkr 2.45010, IRL l.l010, DRA 0.8QI'o, ESC 0.801' 0)~7-
1990 Jan. EMS: realignment (LIT - 3o-l0), narrowing of band to f3olo
June Be]gium: central bank declares German mark exchange rate
as its main official policy tazget
July 1 EMS: complete removal of all capital controls exce t for
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece~deadline 1992~
July 1 Germany: monetazy union between est and East Germany
Oct. 3 Germany: six East German federal states join the Federal
R.epublic of Germany
Oct. 8 EMS: United Kindom enters the exchange rate mechanism of
the EMS with a wide fluctuation margin of fóolo
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys: Germany, France, ltaly, Netherlands, Belgium
and Luxembourg, Denmark, lreland, various issues, Commission of the Europea.n
Communities The EMS: Ten Years of Progress in European Monetary
Co-operation, and Ungerer et al. (1983, 1986).
Notes: At realignments f(-) indicates a revaluation (devaluation) in o1o against
those currencies whose bilteral parities remained unchanged, except for the two
general realignments (Mazch 1983, July 1985), for which the percentages from the
official communiqué aze shown.~8-
Table 2. German Announced Money Gmwth Tazgets and Realisations,
Yeaz on Yeaz ( o.y ) and Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Money
Growth R,ates ~in ~Yo p.a.).
target target range concretised outcome
y.o.y. avg. target y.o.y. avg.
1975 CBM1 8.0 - -
1976 CBMZ - 8.0 -
1977 CBMZ - 8.0 -
1978 CBM2 - 8.0 -
1979 CBMz 6.0-9.0 - lower limit
1980 CBM3 5.0,8.0 - lower limit
1981 CBM3 4.0-7.0 - lower half
1982 CBM3 4.0-7.0 - upper half
1983 CBM3 4.0-7.0 - uppcr half
1984 CBM3 4.0~.0 - -
1985 CBM3 3.0-5.0 - -
1986 CBM3 3.5-5.5 - -
1987 CBM3 3.0-6.0 - -
1988 M3 3 3.0~.0 - -
1989 M3 3 5.0



















Sovirces: Deutsche B~mdesbank, CeschaeJtsberichl, various issu~s, OECD Cnunlry
Surveys, German~, various issues, Neumann ( I!)88) and uwn cdlculatiuns usiu~,
data of OECD Main Economic Indicators, various issues.
Noles: CBM is the central bank money stock, comprised of curreucy iu circulatiun
and required reserves on domestic liabilities, calculates at constant reserve ratios
(base January 1974). M3 is comprised of cash holdings of non-banks, domestic
non-bank sight deposits at banks, time deposits (up to 4 years) and saving deposits
(at statutory notice).
~~ December of preceding yeaz to December of current year.
- Annual average.
Fourth quarter of preceding year to fourth quarter of current year.
y Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).
~ Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).
t Annual average of target achieved (in terms of integer values).-39-
Table 3. French Announced Monetazy Tazgets and Realisations,
Yeaz on Yeaz ( o.y ) and Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Money
Growth Rate~ ~in 96 p.a.).
target target range
1977 M2 1 12.5
1978 M2 1 12.0
1979 M2 1 11.0
1980 M2 ~ 11.0
1981 M2 ~ 10.0-12.0
1982 M21 12.5-13.5
1983 M2 Z 9.0-10.0
1984 M2R2 5.5~.5
1985 M2R2 3.0~.0
1986 M3 2 4.0-6.0

































Sources: OECD Cauntry Surueys, France, various issues, Wyplosz (1988), and own
calculations using data of OECD Main Economic Indicators, various issues.
Notes: M2 is currency, demand deposits, savings and all time deposits, certificates
of deposits plus short-term non-negotiable financial instruments. M2R is that part
of M2 which is held by residents. M3 is total liquidity.
~) December of preceding year to December current yeaz.
2) Quarter centred around December of preceeding year to the same quarter of
current yeaz.
Y Actual tazget achieved ( in integer values).
~ Actual target missed (in integer values).
t Annual average of target achieved (in integer values).~o-
Table 4. Italian Announced Monetary Targets and Itealisationa,
Annual Average (avg.) of Monthly Money Growth Rates (in S'o p.a.).



















tazget target range outcome3
16.8y - - -
5.2r - ' - -
17.1y - - -
22.7a - - -
17.2~ - - -
8.6Y - - -
15.5y - - -
21.6~ M2 i 11.0 12.3~
14.1y M2 1 10.0 14.0~
9.Or M2 i 7.0-11.0 S.Sy
12.6~ M2 ~ 6.0- 9.0 10.8~
12.2~ M2 ~ 6.0- 9.0 7.9r
- M2 ~ 6.0- 9.0 9.7~
- M2 ~ 6.0- 9.0
Sources: OECD Country Sun~eys, Italy. various issues, and own calculations using
data of OECD Main Economic Indicators, vazious issues.
Notes: TDC is total domestíc credit, announced in terms of a ceiling, and consists
of bank and special credit institution loans plus bonds issued by local authorities,
public and private companies (net of loans consolidating debt of local authorities)
less state sector borrowing requirement. M2 is currency m circulation plus demand
and time deposits.
i~ Annual average of growth rate
z Data taken from OECD Country Surveys, Italy, various issues.
3 Calculated as annual average of monthly growth rates from OECD Main
conomic Indicators, various issues.
y) Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).
~) Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).-111-
Table 5. British Announced Monetary Targets and Realisations Yeaz on Year
(y.o.y.) Average of Monthly Money Gmwth Rates (in ~fo p.a.).
target target range outcome target target range outcome
1976 M3 ~ 9.0-13.0 7.30 - - -
1977 CM3 i 9.0-13.0 15.40 - - -
1978 LM3 ~ 8.0-12.0 11.4v - - -
1979 ~M3 ~ 8.0-12.0 10.3v - - -
1980 LM3 ~ 7.0-11.0 19.4r - - -
1981 ~M31 6.0-10.0 12.80 - - -
1982 f;M3 ~ 8.0-12.0 11.2r M1 1 5.0-12.0 12.3r
1983 EM3 i 7.0-11.0 9.5v M1 ~ 7.0-11.0 14.0~
1984 LM3 ~ 6.0-10.0 11.9o MO 1 4.0-8.0 3.10 2
1985 LM3 i 5.0- 9.0 16.5n MO 1 3.0- 7.0 4.4r 2
1986 LM3 i 11.0-15.0 18.2~ MO i 2.0- 6.0 3.2r 2
1987 - - - MO ~ 2.0- 6.0 1.8v 2
1988 - - - MO 1 1.0- 5.0 5.8~ 2
1989 - - - MO 1 1.0- 5.0
1990 - - - MO 1.0- 5.0
Sources: OECD Country Surveys, United Kingdom, various issues, Fischer (1988)
and own calculations using data of OECD Main Econom.ic Indicators, various
issues, and IMF International Financial Statistács, various issues.
Notes: M3 is currency plus private sector demand and time deposits. ~M3 is
currency plus private sector sterling demand and time deposits. M1 is currency
plus private sector demand deposits. MO is notes and coins in circulation and in
banks, and bank's operational balances with the Bank of England.
~) Annual average of growth rate during the financial year, that April of preceeding
yeaz to March of the current yeaz.
2) Calculated as average of monthly growth rates of the financial year using data of
IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues.
r Actual target achieved (in terms of integer values).
~; Actual target missed (in terms of integer values).-4z-
Table 6. Estimated Mazginal Credibility Measure, Percentage Influenoe of
Money Gmwth Target Announcements on Money Gmwth Expectations
in Selected Periodst





























Source: own calculations using data from OECD Main Econom.ic Irzdicators,
vazious issues, and the targets from Table 2 to 5.
Notes: The numbers are marginal credibility estimates n(~`100) with standard
errors (~`100 in parenthesis below) from an ordinary least-squares regression
equation (mr-Em~~f2~-1) - c f~mta-Em~~Slr-1) t v~, vr~N(O,a2), where mi and
m~a are the actual and announc growth rates and Em~ ~ S2t-i is the conditional
forecast of actual money growth from a time series model. Estimates are presented
for the primarily targeted monetary or credit aggregate only (central bank money
stock in Germany, M2 in France, M3 in the United Kingdom, total domestic credit
in Italy). Numbers in italics highlight a significance at least at the 5 percent level.
t) The exact maximum overall sample period for each country is indicated in
Tables 2 to 5.-43-
Table 7. Peroentage Effect of Parity Announcement on Exchange Rate
Expectations at the Moet Likely Time of Policy Switch,
Long Sample Period: Januazy 1975 to Deoember 1989 L),
Short Sample Period: Mazch 1979 to DeoEmber 1989 ().
Samplel Exchange rate Switchpoint
L Germany-NetherlandsOct. 1982 t
L Germany-Belgium Maz.1983 t
L Germany-Denmark June 1982 t
L Netherlands-Belgium Sep. 1982 t
L Netherlands-DenmarkMaz.1983 t
L Belgium-Denmark Mar.1983 t
S Germany-France Sep. 1987 t
S Germany-Italy July 1985 t
S Germany-NetherlandsMay 1985 t
S Germany-Belgium Jan. 1983 t
S Germany-Denmark June 1982 t
S Germany-Ireland June 1986 t
S France-Italy Dec. 1986 t
S France-Netherlands Sep. 1987 t
S France-Belgium Dec. 1986 t
S France-Denmark Mar. 1983 t
S France-Ireland Jan. 1987 t










Italy-Belgium July 1985 t
Italy-Denmark Jan. 1980
Italy-Ireland Sep. 1986 t




Belgium-Ireland Jan. 1987 t
Denmark-Ireland Jan. 1987 t


















































































Notes: The marginal credibility measures for the overall period (MC) and the
two sub-periods (MC~, MCZ) are obtained as ccefficients estimates ( a'100) from
the ordinary least-squares regression (EC-Ec~~St~-I) - c f a(c~~Ect~ftt-1) f v~,
vt ~ N(O,o2) with et as the end of month spot exchange rate, Ee~ 52~-1 as its
conditional forecast from a time series model and cta as the o ical parity
announcement. R,efer to Appendix B for details of the estimates. The numbers in
italics indicate significance of the estimates at least at the 5 percent level, and
stars indicate credible announcements. The timing of the most likely policy switch
is estimated by switching regression on the basis of the likelihood- ratio test
statistic of Quandt (1960). The significance of this structural break is indicated by
the superscript 't' if the majority of six parametric stability tests point towards
instability. The stabilit tests performed are the F-test of Chow ( 1960), the
likelihood- ratio test of ~uandt (1960), the forwazd and backward CUSUMZ test of
Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975), the test for heteroscedasticity of Goldfeld and
Quandt (1965) and a test for heteroscedasticit y based on a regression of s uared
residuals on squared fitted values. For details of these tests see Weber ( 1990a~.
1) L(S) indicates the long (short) sample period.~4-
Table 8. Percentage Effect of Diacount Rate Announcement on Interest Rate
Expectations at the Most Likely Time of Policy Switch,
Sample Period: January 1975 to Deoember 1989









































Notes: The marginal credibility measures for the overall period ( MC) and the
two sub-periods (MCI, MCZ) are obtained as ccefficients estimates ( n`100) from
the ordinary least-squares regression (ic-EiclS2c-1) - c f a(ii~Eii~52t-i) t vc,
v~ ~ N(O,o2) with i~ as the money market (calj money) interest rate, Ei~~f2~-~ as its
conditional forecast from a time series model and i~8 as the offica.l discount rate
announcement. R.efer to Appendix B for details of the estimates. The numbers in
italics indicate significance of the estimates at least at the 5 percent level, a.nd
stars indicate credible announcements. The timing of the most likely policy switch
is estimated by switching regression on the basis of the likelihood- ratio test
statistic of Quandt (1960). The significa.nce of this structural break is indicated by
the superscript ~t~ if the majority of six parametric stability tests point towards
instability. The stability tests performed are the F-test of Chow ( 1960), the
likelihood- ratio test of Quandt (1960), the forward and backward CUSUMZ test of
Brown, Durbin and Evans ( 1975), the test for heteroscedasticity of Goldfeld and
Quandt (1965) and a test for heteroscedasticit y based on a regression of squared
residuals on squared fitted values. For details of these tests see Weber (1990a).Flgure 1a. German Mark EMS Exchange Rates
Index of Nominal Bllateral Exchan~e Rates
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Source: own calculations from bilateral US doNar spot exchange rates,
teken from IMF International Financial Statis(ics, verious issues.Figure 1b. French Franc EMS Exchange Rates
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Source: own calculations from bilateral US doAar spoi exchange rates,
taken from W1F Intemationel Finencial Statistics, various issues.Flgure 2a. EMS Inflatlon Rates
Year to Year Change In Consumer Prlces
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Source: !MF ~hternatronal Financial Statistics, various issues.
Fa áelend monihly wholesale price iMlation retes were used.Figure 2b. EMS and Non-EMS Inflation Rates
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Bretton Woods Period (60M2-71M7)
Key to symbols:
~ Bretton Woods versus Snake ~ Bretton Woods versus EMS
g- Germany, f e France, i- Italy, n~ Netherlands,
b- Belgium, d- Denmark, e- keland,
bilateral rates are indicated by the combination of these symbols.Figure 5. MC Credibllity Measure for Exchange Rates
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Late EMS Period (87M1-89M12) Early EMS Period (79M3-83M2)
Key to symbols:
g~ Germany, f~ France, i- Italy, n- Netherlands, b- Belgium, d a Dermark,
e- Ireland, bilateral rates are indicated by the combination of these symbolsFlgure 6. AC Credibility Measure for Exchange Rates
Wldth of the Band AdJusted for Expected Devlatlons
of the Exchan~e Rate from the Offlclal Parlty (In "~o)
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Early EMS Period (79M3-83M21
Key to Symbols:
g- Germany, t- France, i- Itety, n- Netherlands, b- Belglum, d- Denmark,
e~ ieland, bdaterel rates are inácated by the combination of these symbols.
Note: For Italy a 2.25~ band instead of the official 6B band was used in the calculations.Figure 7a. EMS Interest Rates
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Influence of Discount Rate Announcements
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~ money market (cal money) rate ~ long-term goverment bond rate
g- Germany, f- France, i- Italy, n- Netherlands
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